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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GAIL PARSONS HEYES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20588

JOHN R. WARD,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the defendant, who has been solely employed by the

University of Utah School of Medicine and Hospital for the past
27 years, entitled to the protection of the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1
et seg. (1977), for alleged acts or omissions occurring in the
performance of his employment duties?
2.

May plaintiff assert for the first time on appeal an

estoppel defense which was not raised in the lower court?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for alleged medical malpractice brought
by plaintiff against defendant, Dr. John R. Ward ("Dr. Ward")
for treatment rendered to plaintiff by defendant at the

University of Utah School of Medicine and Hospital, where
Dr. Ward has been employed as an academic professor and Chief
of the Division of Rheumatology since July 1957.
Dr. Ward moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint in the
lower court on the basis that, as an employee of the University
of Utah, he may not be held individually liable apart from the
University for acts and omissions occurring in the performance
of his duties or within the scope of his employment, unless he
acted with fraud or malice.

The lower court continued defen-

dant's motion to allow plaintiff time to conduct discovery into
Dr. Ward's employment relationship with the University of
Utah.

Defendant's motion was subsequently renewed as a motion

for summary judgment.

The lower court, the Honorable Leonard

H. Russon presiding, granted defendant's motion and entered
summary judgment.

This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Dr. John R. Ward is a board certified specialist in the
field of internal medicine.

[R. 69-3.]

He has been perma-

nently employed at the University of Utah School of Medicine
and Hospital since July 1, 1957.

[R. 10, 15, 69-4.] He serves

on the medical school's academic faculty and is Chief of the
Division of Rheumatology in the Department of Internal
Medicine.

[R. 8, 10, 69-4.]
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Dr. Ward's employment duties for the University include the
teaching and training of medical students, medical research,
and the treatment and care of patients who visit the University's state-owned hospital.

[R. 10, 11, 69-5.]

His sole

source of professional income is the regular University payroll
check he receives every two weeks.

[R. 69-6.]

Dr. Ward does

not maintain a private practice or see any patients outside the
University Hospital.

[R.

69-8.]

Charges for Dr. Ward's

services are billed and collected by the University physician's
billing office.
Dr. Ward treated plaintiff Gail Parsons Heyes for her
rheumatoid arthritis condition exclusively at the University
Hospital, within the scope of his employment duties with the
University.

[R. 8, 9, and 11.]

Plaintiff does not claim

Dr. Ward ever misrepresented to her his employment relationship
with the University.

She claims only that Dr. Ward never

specifically told her he was employed by the University.
34-35.]

[R.

She nevertheless made her first checks payable to

Dr. Ward in care of the Division of Arthritis [R. 36], and
later made payment in care of the Division of Rheumatology at
the University Hospital address [R. 35, 42, and Brief of
Appellant, p. 4].
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on May 9,
1984.

[R. 2-3.]

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in
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response to the Complaint.

[R. 6-7.]

The motion was supported

by the Affidavits of Dr. Ward [R. 8-9], and Dr. G. Richard Lee
[R. 10-11].
davits.

Plaintiff did not raise any objection to the affi-

The lower court denied plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss,

without prejudice, and allowed plaintiff 60 days to pursue
discovery as to the defendant's employment relationship with
the University.

[R. 24.]

Plaintiff took Dr. Ward's deposition

and served Interrogatories.

She also filed her own affidavit

in opposition to defendant's motion.

[R. 34-49.]

At the com-

pletion of the discovery permitted by the lower court, defendant's motion was renewed.

The lower court entered Summary

Judgment in defendant's favor.

[R. 64-66.]

This appeal

followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah legislature has established as the public policy
of this State that the employees of governmental entities are
to be protected against personal liability for acts performed
in furtherance of their official duties and employment.
Dr. John R. Ward has been employed by the University of Utah
School of Medicine and Hospital exclusively for the past 28
years.

His employment duties at the University include the

treatment of patients, such as plaintiff, who come to the
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University's state-owned hospital for medical care.

As a

matter of law, Dr. Ward's treatment of plaintiffs rheumatoid
arthritis condition, performed solely at the University
Hospital, was within the performance and scope of his employment with the University.

He is therefore entitled to the

protection of the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Ward is estopped to assert
governmental immunity as a defense was not raised before the
lower court and may not, therefore, be asserted for the first
time in this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DR. WARD'S TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF WAS
RENDERED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
AN EMPLOYEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH AND
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS THEREFORE BARRED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT.
The provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seg. (1977) (hereinafter "the Act"),
provide the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity or
its employee for any injury caused by an act or omission "which
occurs during the performance of such employee's duties, within
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the scope of employment, or under color of authority . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(3) (Supp. 1983).

The term "govern-

mental entity/' as defined by the Act, includes the state of
Utah and any hospital, college or university of the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(1) (Supp. 1983).
A state employee whose act or omission is alleged to have
caused injury to a plaintiff may be joined in a lawsuit against
the governmental entity, but only in a representative capacity
and only if the act or omission is one for which the entity
itself is liable.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-30-4(4) (Supp, 1983).

The employee may never be held personally liable, unless he
acted through gross negligence, fraud or malice,

Xd.J see

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah 1983) ("Section
63-30-4 precludes all statutory or common law causes of action
against an employee in his or her personal capacity for acts or
omissions which occur during the performance of the employee's
duties. . . . " ) .
It is undisputed that Dr. John Ward was an employee of the
University of Utah at all times when he rendered health care
treatment to plaintiff.

Plaintiff seeks to impose personal

liability upon Dr. Ward, but has not alleged he acted through
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gross negligence, fraud or malice.1

Dr. Ward is therefore

entitled to the protection afforded by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, and the judgment of the lower court in his favor
is correct, if the acts or omissions alleged by plaintiff
occurred "during the performance of [Dr. Ward's] duties, within
the scope of employment or under color of authority . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (Supp. 1983).
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the lower court erred in
granting Dr. Ward summary judgment since there is a fact question as to whether the treatment he rendered plaintiff was
within the scope of his employment at the University.

It is

not necessary for the court to even address plaintiff's scope
of employment argument to decide this appeal.

Section

63-30-4(4) protects Dr. Ward against personal liability if his
treatment of plaintiff was either within the performance of his
employment duties or within the scope of his employment.

These

two statutory phrases, although obviously related, must be
interpreted to represent different concepts.

See Metropolitan

Water Dist. of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 14 Utah 2d
171, 380 P.2d 721 (1963) (court must assume all words in

*This is not a case where Dr. Ward is joined in a representative capacity in an action against the University of
Utah. Plaintiff lost any potential claim she may have had
against the University since she did not file a timely notice
of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 1983).
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statute were used advisedly and should be given meaning);
Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County School Dist., 604
P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1979) (duty of Supreme Court is to give
effect to every word, clause and sentence of legislative
enactment).
It is undisputed on the record before this Court that
Dr. Ward's employment duties with the University of Utah
include the treatment of patients who come to the University of
Utah Medical Center and Hospital.

[R. 69-5.]

Dr. Ward's depo-

sition and the Affidavits of Dr. Ward and Dr. G. Richard Lee,
Dean of the School of Medicine, further establish that
Dr. Ward's treatment of plaintiff was rendered in the performance of his duties with the University.2

Plaintiff's own

affidavit, stating that Dr. Ward never told her he was a
University employee, does not raise an issue of fact concerning
Dr. Ward's employment situation.

A person's ignorance of an

agency relationship does not change the fact that the relationship exists, and is not a basis for imposing liability upon the
agent.

2

Plaintiff's argument that the affidavits are conclusory
and should not therefore have been considered by the lower
court is not timely. Plaintiff waived any objection she may
have had to the affidavits by failing to move to strike or
otherwise object to the affidavits in the lower court. See
Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979) (if opposing
party does not move timely to object to or strike affidavits,
party waives right to argue affidavits do not comply with Rule
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
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Dr. Ward's only professional employment since 1956 has been
with the University of Utah School of Medicine and Hospital.
His sole source of professional income is his bi-monthly salary
check from the University.

His compensation from the

University does include a factored percentage of the income the
University derives from the treatment of patients, as referred
to by plaintiff.
tiff's claim.

This fact does not in any way enhance plain-

These receipts are entirely University funds,

and the percentage Dr. Ward receives is negotiated each year as
part of his salary package.

[R. 69-9 and 10.]

In fact, this

arrangement further demonstrates that the University is the
sole recipient of the income derived from Dr. Ward's services.
Dr. Ward's treatment of plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis
was rendered only at the University Hospital.

Plaintiff

received billing statements from the physician's billing office
at the University Hospital, and made her checks payable to
Dr. Ward in care of the "Division of Rheumatology" and
"Division of Arthritis."

The only conclusion possible on the

record before this Court was that Dr. Ward was indeed acting in
the "performance of his duties" during his professional treatment of plaintiff's arthritis condition.
A similar conclusion must be reached on the facts before
this Court even if the operative issue is whether the acts of
Dr. Ward were "within the scope of his employment."
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Contrary

to plaintiff's argument, the issue of scope of employment may
be decided as a matter of law where there is but one reasonable
conclusion to be reached on the facts.

See e.g. Baird v.

Farmer Bros. Northwest, Inc., 14 Utah 2d 279, 382 P.2d 883
(1963); Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034
(Wyo. 1978).

As shown above, the facts before this Court can

lead only to the conclusion that defendant acted within the
scope of his employment in his treatment of plaintiff.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT ARGUE ESTOPPEL FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
It is a well settled rule that an argument for estoppel
must be presented to the trial court and cannot be asserted for
the first time on appeal.

See Davis v. Barrett, 24 Utah 2d

162, 467 P.2d 603, 604 (1970) (claimant's subcontractor was
estopped to deny release of lien was not presented to trial
court and cannot be considered for first time on appeal; see
also Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981) (summary
judgment affirmed where contentions of appellant were not
reflected in record but were argued for the first time in brief
on appeal).

An appellant who asserts an argument for estoppel

has the affirmative burden to preserve and bring before this
Court a record which affirmatively supports that his position
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was argued to the lower court.

Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d

499, 500 (Utah 1976).
Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate on the record before
this Court that she properly and timely raised before the lower
court her argument that Dr. Ward is estopped to raise the
defense of the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13.)

Plaintiff is therefore

precluded from now raising such an argument for the first time
on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Utah legislature has established by statute its intent
that government employees be protected from personal liability,
and the attendant time and expense of litigation, for acts
performed in the furtherance of their employment duties.

If a

claimant is allowed to drag an employee through the time and
expense of litigation by merely alleging that the employee was
not acting in the performance of his official duties simply
because he did not disclose to the claimant his agency relationship, then the salutary purpose and protection granted by
the legislature is seriously undermined, if not eliminated.
Dr. Ward is a long time employee of the University of
Utah.

Upon the undisputed record before this Court, his treat-

ment of plaintiff was rendered within the performance of his
employment duties with the University and within the scope of
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his employment.

He is therefore entitled to the protection of

the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act# and the
judgment of the lower court in his favor should be affirmed.
DATED this 5th day of August, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Merlin R. Lybbert^
Bruce H. Jensen
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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